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This paper explores the proposal that there is a close link between counterfactual thinking and 
lying. Both require the imagination of alternatives to reality and we describe four studies 
which explore this link. In Study 1 we measured individual differences in both abilities and 
found that individuals with a tendency to generate counterfactual thoughts were also more 
likely to generate potential lies. Studies 2 and 3 showed that counterfactual availability 
influences people’s ability to come up with lies and the extent to which they expect others to 
lie. Study 4 used a behavioural measure of deception to show that people tend to lie more in 
situations also known to elicit counterfactual thoughts. Overall, the results show that the 
imagination of alternatives to the past plays an important role in the generation of lies. We 
discuss the implications for the fields of counterfactual thinking and deception.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Reconsidering our past decisions by wondering what could have been had we chosen 
differently is a common feature of human thought. The process of undoing past events is 
termed counterfactual thinking and is characterised by the mental simulation of alternatives to 
reality. By imagining how things could be different, counterfactual thinking helps us learn 
from past mistakes, set goals for the future and solve problems (Epstude & Roese, 2008; 
Smallman & Roese, 2009). Our aim in this paper is to test the idea that imagining alternatives 
to the past may also be an important part of the process of generating lies
1
.  
Although the link between counterfactuals and deception has received little attention, 
some research points towards a positive association between these two processes. Like 
counterfactuals, lying about the past requires the generation of alternatives to reality which in 
both cases is achieved through mentally altering previous events (Debey, De Houwer, & 
Verschuere, 2014; Malone, Adams, Anderson, Ansfield, & DePaulo, 1997) and in both cases 
these changes tend to be minimal (Byrne, 2016; Vrij, Granhag & Mann, 2010).  
Additionally, separate studies in the two areas suggest that the generation of both 
counterfactuals and deceit rely on the same core component processes of executive function 
such as inhibitory control and working memory (Drayton, Turley-Ames, & Guajardo, 2011; 
Gombos, 2006). Age related changes to these executive functions are associated with a 
decrease in the frequency we engage in both deception and counterfactual thinking (Debey, 
De Schryver, Logan, Suchotzki, & Verschuere, 2015; Walsh, Deeprose & Briazu, 2016). This 
can be linked to prefrontal lobe function as populations characterised by prefrontal cortical 
impairment, such as Parkinson’s disease patients, have impairments in both processes (Abe et 
                                               
1
 The terms lies and deception will be used interchangeably 
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al., 2009; McNamara, Durso, Brown, & Lynch, 2003). Counterfactual thinking therefore may 
represent an important process in the generation of lies.  
Yet, despite the commonalities between counterfactual thinking and deception, few 
studies have assessed the potential link. So far studies show that counterfactual reflection can 
influence the perception of dishonesty (Miller, Visser & Staub, 2005) and the likelihood of 
engaging in future unrelated unethical acts (Gaspar, Seabright, Reynolds & Yam, 2015). 
Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf and De Dreu (2011) also showed that observed alternatives can 
influence subsequent deception. In their study, participants were asked to declare the outcome 
of a die roll which only they could see and which determined the value of a monetary prize. 
Although they were asked to report only the outcome of their first die roll, when they were 
allowed to roll additional times, participants were more likely to lie. The observation of 
alternative desirable die rolls (higher than the one initially obtained) brought to mind events 
that almost happened, thus allowing participants to justify their deception. However in this 
study, individuals observed additional die rolls and therefore were not required to mentally 
simulate alternatives whereas most counterfactual thoughts occur automatically through the 
mental imagination of alternatives (Byrne, 2005).  
 Therefore the question remains, are counterfactual thoughts and deception associated? 
If so, how does the stimulation of alternatives to past events influence subsequent deceptive 
communication? The present work aims to answer these questions by examining the link 
between counterfactuals and lies using measures which allow for the direct assessment of 
both processes. By manipulating factors known to stimulate the mental representation of  
counterfactuals we developed both scenario-based and behavioural measures to assess 
whether the predisposition to engage in counterfactual thinking is associated with the 
propensity to deceive (study 1) and to further examine whether changing the availability of 
counterfactual alternatives impacts on individuals subsequent deceptive responses (study 2 
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and study 4) and inferences about the likelihood that someone will lie (study 3). Overall the 
current paper aims to clarify the relationship between imagining alternatives to the past and 
deceptive communication.  
 
2. Study 1 
 Our first study focused on the relationship between counterfactuals and deception 
using an individual differences approach. People differ in the ability and degree to which they 
engage in counterfactual thought (Allen, Greenlees, & Jones, 2014) and deception (Johnson 
et al., 2005). As counterfactual thinking and deception have not been assessed simultaneously, 
we wanted to assess whether these tendencies are related within a single study. We tested 
people’s spontaneous tendency to produce counterfactual thoughts and deception, and also 
their ability to generate these when cued. If counterfactual thinking and deception share the 
same underlying processes, then we should find a positive association between the 
spontaneous tendency to think counterfactually and lie and between the ability to generate 
counterfactuals and lies when cued. Spontaneous and cued generations are governed by 
different mechanisms (Gomez-Belderrain, Garcia-Monco, Astigarraga, Gonzalez & Grafman, 
2005) therefore we did not expect these to be associated.  
 
2.1.  Method 
2.1.1. Participants 
The participants were 81 undergraduate students who received course credit for their 
participation. One participant did not complete all the tasks and was therefore excluded from 
the analysis. The remaining participants (60 female) ranged in age from 18 to 40 years (M = 
20.23, SD = 3.20).  
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2.1.2. Materials and Procedure 
Two scenarios were developed based on factors known to affect the mutability of 
events (e.g. Byrne, 2002; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Roese & Olson, 1995). Counterfactuals 
are more likely to follow negative outcomes (Roese, 1997), therefore each scenario described 
events during which participants were asked to imagine making a series of decisions which 
lead to an unexpected and bad outcome. Each scenario was followed by questions probing 
whether participants would be inclined to lie about elements included in the scenarios. As 
deceptive responses depend on the potential outcome for the liar (ten Brinke & Porter, 2012), 
one of the scenarios involved a low risk deception opportunity (lying to a neighbour) whilst 
the other was of higher risk (i.e. lying to the police). 
In the ‘moving town’ scenario, adapted from McEleney and Byrne (2006), 
participants were asked to imagine moving to a new town and making decisions which result 
in difficulties meeting new friends. These decisions included: moving town, going to a movie 
rather than a neighbour’s party and buying a new stereo rather than joining the gym with a 
work colleague.  
The ‘car incident’ scenario was developed specifically for this study. Participants 
were asked to imagine making a series of decisions which lead to a minor car accident. These 
included going shopping to a supermarket rather than the corner shop, responding to a phone 
call whilst driving instead of ignoring it and driving down a new route rather than a more 
familiar one.  
Participants were given a 12 page booklet and responded to all questions in writing. 
They first received the scenarios in a counterbalanced order. After each one, spontaneous 
counterfactual thinking was elicited by giving them 5 minutes to write a diary page about 
their imagined experience. After completing both diary pages, we asked questions assessing 
dishonesty. To measure spontaneous deception, participants received two questions for each 
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scenario. For the ‘moving town’ scenario, participants had to write down anything they 
would say to their neighbour when meeting them after the party they had failed to attend. 
They were also asked to write any specific reason they would give for not attending the party. 
For the ‘car accident scenario’, participants had to write down anything they would say to the 
police if they were to come to their door and ask about the car accident and anything they 
would say to the police when questioned whether they had specifically seen anyone 
damaging the car. No time limit was imposed for answering these questions. Cued deception 
was measured by asking participants to write down all the things they could say if they 
wanted to mislead the neighbour or police. Finally, cued counterfactuals were measured by 
directly asking how things might have happened differently in each scenario. Throughout the 
study participants were allowed to look back at the scenarios as often as they wished.  
 
2.1.3. Coding 
Spontaneous counterfactuals were coded from the diary page text by two independent 
raters. Counterfactuals were defined as thoughts about how events in the scenario could have 
been different (McEleney & Byrne, 2006), for instance, ‘If only I had gone shopping another 
time, I wouldn’t have hit the car’. Inter-rater reliability was high for both spontaneous (r 
= .95) and cued counterfactuals (r = .96). All discrepancies were resolved by discussion. 
For spontaneous deception, participants coded their own statements in order to ensure 
that their deception was intentional and that potentially ambiguous statements (i.e., comments 
relating to the participant’s own traits and past experiences) could be coded correctly. At the 
end of the study participants were instructed to look over their written statements in response 
to the two questions and code each sentence as either a lie or a truth according to the 
following definition of deception previously used by Serota, Levine, and Boster (2010): 
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 ‘Most people think a lie occurs any time you intentionally try to mislead 
someone. Some lies are big while others are small; some are completely false 
statements and others are truths with a few essential details made up or left 
out. Some lies are obvious, and some are very subtle. Some lies are told for a 
good reason. Some lies are selfish, other lies protect others. We are interested 
in all these different types of lies.’ 
  Participants’ classification of sentences into lies and truths was double-checked by 
one coder against the scenarios themselves. A lie was correctly classified as such only if it 
contradicted the events as described in the scenarios. Items which were ambiguous, e.g. ‘I 
would be too anxious to go to the party on my own’, were assumed to be correctly identified 
by the participant.  Two participants mistakenly classed a truth as a lie and one participant 
incorrectly classed a statement which contradicted the events as described in the scenario as a 
truth. These inaccuracies were corrected by the coder. For each scenario, spontaneous and 
cued deception measures constituted the combined number of unique lies across the open and 
closed ended questions.  
 
2.2. Results  
Outlying cases with z  > 3.20 were removed from each of the outcome variables 
before any other analysis was performed (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Based on this, a total 
of two participants were excluded, one from each of the outcome variables (less than 2.5% of 
data in each analysis).  
 
2.2.1. Association between scenarios  
Participants responded similarly to both scenarios. We found positive correlations 
between the two scenarios for measures of spontaneous and cued counterfactuals (rs = .31,     
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p = .005; rs = .33, p = .003 respectively) and for measures of spontaneous and cued lies        
(rs = .26, p = .023; rs = .49, p < .001 respectively). Based on these results we combined the 
equivalent counterfactual and deception variables.  
 
2.2.2. Association between counterfactual thinking and deception  
Table 1 shows the mean number of counterfactuals and lies generated across the two 
scenarios as well as the correlation between the variables of interest. As predicted, 
participants who spontaneously generated counterfactuals were more likely to generate 
spontaneous lies (rs = .24, p = .034). Similarly, there was a correlation between the number of 
counterfactuals and lies when both were directly solicited (rs = .23, p = .042).  
 
Table 1. The mean number of counterfactuals and lies generated in the two combined 
scenarios together with correlation between these variables 
 Range M (SD)              Correlations rs 
   1                 2               3          
1. Total Spontaneous CF 0 to 6 1.73 (1.61) 
 
2. Total Cued CF 2 to 13 7.10 (2.15) .06 
3. Total Spontaneous Lies 0 to 9 2.73 (2.00) .24*            .14 
4. Total Cued Lies 2 to 15 8.31 (2.56) -.09              .23*          .04 
The items in bold are our key comparisons. The * indicates that p < .05. 
 
To ensure that this relationship is due to the availability of alternatives and not simply 
due to writing fluency, we also performed the above correlations partialling out the number 
of words participants wrote in the diary task. These results were equivalent to the ones 
previously presented: (rs = .25, p = .016) and (rs = .23, p =. 024) for spontaneous and cued 
thoughts respectively, indicating a relationship independent of verbal fluency.  
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As predicted, Table 1 also highlights that there was no association between cued and 
spontaneous generations for either counterfactual statements or deceptive statements. 
Furthermore, we found no association between cued generations of counterfactual statements 
and spontaneous deception, or between spontaneous generations of counterfactual statements 
and cued generations of lies. These findings provide new insight into our understanding of 
the cognitive factors that permit the construction of deceitful statements..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
3. Study 2 
Results from our first study show that individuals with a tendency to think 
counterfactually tend to generate more lies. In Study 2 we examined the link between 
counterfactuals and deception by testing whether changing the availability of counterfactual 
alternatives also influences the tendency to lie. We know that our intrinsic honesty is 
compromised by characteristics of the environment and of the situation we find ourselves in. 
In environments where the prevalence of rule violation is high people tend to lie more 
(Gachter & Schultz, 2016), and dishonesty is enhanced if the degree to which the truth needs 
to be altered is small (Hilbig & Hessler, 2013). 
The characteristics of a particular situation also affect the generation of counterfactual 
thoughts.  If the situation is unusual, we tend to think about what would usually happen 
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986), and when we encounter a near-miss, we tend to think about 
what almost happened (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). If generating counterfactuals is an 
important component in deception, we would expect to find more lies in these situations 
where counterfactuals are readily available. Study 2 investigated this specific hypothesis 
using two versions of the scenarios used in the first study, one with a highly available 
counterfactual alternative and one without.  We expected that people will generate more lies 
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when the events are presented as either unusual or as if they almost didn’t happen, due to the 
increased availability of counterfactuals.  
 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1.  Participants and Design 
 One hundred and twenty-two participants (53 female) were recruited online. They 
ranged in age from 18 to 50 years (M = 24.38, SD = 6.65). The study had a between subjects 
design and participants were randomly assigned to the low counterfactual condition (n = 60) 
or to the high counterfactual condition (n = 62). An a priori power analysis showed that 59 
participants per condition should have 80% power to detect an effect size Cohen’s d of 0.50. 
We collected data until the close of the day on which the actual sample size reached or 
exceeded 59 in each condition. 
3.1.2. Materials and Procedure 
We constructed high counterfactual and low counterfactual versions of the scenarios 
used in study 1. Participants received either both high counterfactual versions or both low 
counterfactual versions in a counterbalanced order. As before, participants were asked to 
imagine themselves in the scenario. To make the differences more salient, each scenario 
contained only one explicit decision and the two versions of the scenarios differed only in the 
mutability of that decision. For the ‘moving town’ scenario, participants were solely 
presented with the decision to go the cinema rather than the neighbour’s party. In the low 
counterfactual version, the decision to go to the cinema was portrayed as routine (i.e. 
something done on a regular basis), whilst in the high counterfactual version, the decision to 
go to the cinema was described as exceptional (i.e. something never done).  
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After reading the scenario participants had to write down anything they would say to 
the neighbour if asked why they failed to attend the party. To measure cued deception, they 
were then asked to list all the lies they could tell the neighbour in that instance.  
For the ‘car accident’ scenario, we manipulated the counterfactual salience of the 
accident by altering the perceived closeness of the event. In the low counterfactual version, 
the car that was hit had been parked there for a long time, whilst in the high counterfactual 
version, the car had only parked there minutes before. After reading the scenario participants 
had to write anything they would say to the police when they were asked whether they knew 
anything about the car accident. Following this question participants were also directly asked 
to list as many lies as they could think of, in order to mislead the police.  
Finally, participants completed self-report measures of counterfactual thinking and 
deception. The Schwartz Regret Scale (Schwartz et al., 2002) and the self-report measure 
used in Gomez-Beldarrain et al. (2005) study were used to assess aspects of counterfactual 
thinking and the Serota et al. (2010) measure was used to assess the number of lies 
participants told in the past 24 hour.  
 
3.1.3. Coding  
 Two independent raters coded the number of deceptive responses given in response to 
each of the two scenarios. Deceptive responses were coded based on the same definition used 
in Study 1 (Serota et al., 2010). Each lie was given a score of 1 and inter-rater reliability was 
high for both spontaneous (r = .94) and cued deception (r = .96). 
3.2. Results  
Outlying cases with z > 3.20 were removed from each of the outcome variables before 
any other analysis was performed (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Based on this, for the 
spontaneous deception outcome variable, two participants were removed from the low 
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counterfactual condition and three participants were excluded from the high counterfactual 
condition, for the cued generations, two participants were removed from the low 
counterfactual condition (less than 4.06% of data in each analysis).  
3.2.1. Baseline counterfactual and deception tendencies  
 The two groups did not differ in their baseline tendencies to engage in counterfactual 
thinking as measured with the Schwartz scale (M = 21.97 in the Low CFT condition vs M = 
21.35 in the High CFT condition, U = 1776.0, p= .560) or as measured with the Gomez-
Belderrain scale (M = 17.54 in the Low CFT condition vs M = 16.66 in the High CFT 
condition, U = 1742.0, p = .450). Similarly the two groups also did not differ in their in their 
natural propensity to deceive as indexed by the number of lies they had told in previous 24 
hours (M = 4.75 in the Low CFT group vs M = 3.33 in the High CFT group, U = 1625.0,       
p = .355).  
3.2.2. Deception Scores 
 As shown in Table 2, participants in each condition responded similarly to both 
scenarios. Based on these results and in a similar manner to study 1 we added the scores for 
both scenarios in order to analyse the overall deception scores. 
Table 2. Mean number of spontaneous deceptive responses per scenario in each condition 




Z value P value 
Low CFT .75 (.75) .71 (.56) -.405 .686 
High CFT .92 (.78) 1.03 (.73) -.680 .497 
  
A comparison between the two conditions revealed that participants in the High CFT 
condition spontaneously produced more lies (M = 1.93, SD = 1.19) than participants in the 
Low CFT condition (M = 1.47, SD = .92; U =1347.0, p = .025, r = .21). The two groups did 
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not differ however in cued generations in the Low CFT condition or (M = 4.17, SD = 2.05) in 
the High CFT condition (M = 3.90, SD = 2.13; U = 1658.0, p = .366). These results show that 
people tend to be able to generate more lies when a counterfactual alternative is readily 
available.  
 
4. Study 3 
Counterfactuals can influence the way in which we judge others. The contrast between 
what actually happened and what could have happened can give rise to conclusions about 
what caused the event and can in turn influences the ascriptions we make in regards to other 
people’s intentions, traits or emotions (Gavanski & Wells, 1989, Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; 
Knobe, 2010). For example, imagine hearing about Ben, who was attacked while out running. 
If he took a new route that day then people may readily imagine a scenario in which he took 
his usual route and wasn’t attacked. Exceptional events such as this are often the focus of 
counterfactual thoughts and as a result are often blamed for unwanted outcomes and can 
amplify emotional reactions (Kahneman & Miller, 1986).  The salience of what could have 
happened which is brought through by unusual events and near-misses has the ability to bias 
our judgements.  
It then follows, that, if as suggested by our previous studies, lies are more likely in 
situations where counterfactuals are more readily available, then such circumstances should 
also influence our perceptions of other’s intentions to lie. Therefore, the current study tested 
whether people will also be judged as more likely to lie in situations where counterfactual 
alternatives are more salient. Miller et al. (2005) have already shown that we tend to judge 
others as more dishonest if we ourselves imagine how they would have done so under 
different circumstances. However, in the current study we were interested to see whether 
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there is a relationship between the protagonist’s own counterfactual thoughts and the 
likelihood that they will be judged as deceptive.   
The study was modelled on the Counterfactual Inference Test (CIT; Hooker, Roese & 
Park, 2000), a multiple choice test used to measure individual’s tendency to use available 
counterfactuals in making affective judgements. In this study, we examined whether available 




A total of 102 participants (43 female) were recruited and performed the study online. 
They ranged in age from 18 to 43 (M = 23.71, SD = 5.49).  
4.2.2. Materials and Procedure 
We generated six scenarios and as in Experiment 2, we used unusual events and near-
misses to elicit counterfactual thinking. Each scenario described similar events experienced 
by two actors which led to the same negative outcome. For half of the scenarios, one action 
was exceptional and the other routine, for example:  
 
John crashes his dad's car while driving on his usual way home. Bob crashes his 
dad's car whilst trying a new way home.  
 
The other three scenarios also contained two similar events but one was a near miss 
whereas the other was not, for example: 
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Adele and Rachel are taking part in an experiment. They are given a die and told that 
if they roll a six three times they will win ten pounds. The experimenter cannot see the 
actual die rolls. Adele rolls two sixes, Rachel rolls one six.  
 
The scenarios also included a third party which could subsequently be the target of an 
act of deception. In the examples above the third party is the dad and the experimenter 
respectively.  The scenarios were presented twice in two separate blocks. A full set of 
scenarios are presented in appendix A. The counterfactual questions were administered in one 
block and the deception questions were administered in a separate block. The two blocks 
were separated by a set of questionnaires which were not of interest to this study. The order 
of the blocks was randomised as were the order of the items within the blocks and the order 
of the response options. 
To assess whether participants attributed more counterfactual thoughts to the 
protagonist that experienced the unusual event or the near-miss, all items asked the following 
question:  
 
Who spends more time thinking about how things could have been different?  
 
The questions which assessed participants’ inferences about the protagonists’ honesty all had 
the following structure:  
 
Who is more likely to lie to x about y?  
 
where x denotes the target of deception in the scenario, and y was the outcome. For the first 
example above, the question was: 




Who is more likely to lie to their dad about crashing the car?  
 
All questions had three response options which were identical for each section. One 
option was the protagonist associated with the target counterfactual event, another one 
referred to the alternative protagonist in the scenario and a third final option was ‘Same/can’t 
tell’. For the above item the target response option was ‘Bob’.  
 
4.2.3. Pilot Study 
To check if the new items elicited counterfactual inferences, we pilot-tested the 
counterfactual questions on a sample of 28 participants. For each item, the majority of 
participants (68% to 92%) selected the response option that referred to the target 
counterfactual response. A chi-square analysis for each item revealed that this pattern was 
significant (𝜒2 (2) = 14.48, 21.44, 25.04, 38.96, 29.12, 13.76; all p’s <.001). These 
preliminary results suggest that all items elicited counterfactual inferences in the majority of 
participants.  
 
4.3. Results  
Results were checked for outliers but none were identified therefore all data was 
included in the analysis. Data was normally distributed therefore we used parametric analysis.  
Table 3 shows the percentage of participants choosing each response options for the six items. 
We were specifically interested in the endorsement rates for the target counterfactual options 
versus the non-target alternative response. Participants were significantly more likely to 
choose the target option than the non-target option in response to both the counterfactual (67% 
vs.7%; χ
2
(1)= 293.13, p < .001)  and deception questions (51% vs.13%; χ
2
(1)= 135.64,  p 
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< .001). This pattern occurred for the counterfactual question in all six scenarios and for the 
deception question in all scenarios except scenario 6 (see Table 3). 
 
 




       Questions  CFT 
response 












  Deception 
 
50% 5% 45% 
     
 
2 
 Counterfactual 76% 4% 20% 
  Deception 
 
68% 9% 23% 
     
 
3 
 Counterfactual 80% 10% 10% 
  Deception 
 
76% 11% 19% 
     
 
4 
 Counterfactual 71% 5% 24% 
  Deception 
 




    
 Counterfactual 
 









    
 
6 
 Counterfactual 44% 10% 46% 
  Deception 
 
21% 27% 52% 
  Counterfactual 67% 7% 26% 
Total     
  Deception 51% 13% 36% 
 
 
One explanation for the exception in item 6 may be that the causal link between the 
event which could be undone (i.e. getting off at the unusual vs usual bus stop) and the 
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outcome (forgetting the package on the bus) was weaker in comparison to the other items. 
This highlights the fact that additional factors may be needed for individuals to use 
counterfactuals to lie. 
The results also showed a positive correlation between counterfactual and deception 
judgements (r = .39, p < .001). When participants that endorsed the target option for the 
counterfactual question, they tended to do so for the deception question also.  
Overall these results are consistent with the results of our previous studies and suggest that 
people use counterfactual inferences in order to make judgements relating to dishonesty. 
 
5. Study 4 
     Our previous studies used a scenario based methodology to assess whether people are 
more likely to generate lies in situations which tend to elicit counterfactual thoughts. 
Participants easily and readily engaged with the scenarios as evidenced by their inclusion of 
names and description of feelings. However, in real life situations, interpersonal deception is 
dynamic and requires quick responses (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). The current study therefore 
aimed to test the effect of counterfactual availability on lying in this context.  
We wanted to design a paradigm in which we could directly manipulate counterfactual 
alternatives and where we could directly assess decisions to lie at an individual level. Based 
on the deception decision task developed by Gneezy, Rockenbach and Serra-Garcia (2013), 
we designed a game in which participants could lie in order to increase their own benefits 
with no costs to themselves but potentially at a cost for another. To manipulate counterfactual 
availability, participants played a game with multiple trials in which they lost by a narrow or 
wide margin. If deception is influenced by thoughts of how things could have happened 
differently, people should lie more often in instances where the desired outcome was 
narrowly missed than in situations where the desired outcome was completely missed.  




5.1.1. Participants  
Sixty one participants took part in this study (53 females). Participants ranged in age 
from 18 to 50 years (M = 21.31, SD = 6.62). All participants were undergraduate students at 
Plymouth University who received course credit for their participation. 
5.1.2. Materials and Procedure  
Participants had 24 trials on a slot machine game and their aim was to accumulate as 
many points as possible. The slot machine had two columns of spinning numbers. 
Participants pressed a button to stop the numbers spinning and they won if the sum of the 
numbers matched a target number (ranging from 1-8) which was presented at the top of the 






                         
Figure 1. Pre-determined numbers in each condition for target number 4. 
There were three types of trials: win, near-miss and loss and each participant received 
8 trials of each type. In the win condition, the slot machine always stopped on two numbers 
which correctly added up to the target number. In the near-miss condition, one column 
stopped between two numbers. Participants were told if this happened, then the lower number 
 
Near-miss Win Loss 
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would count. In all cases, if the higher number was added to the second number, then the total 
would have matched the target (see figure 1 for an example). In the loss condition, one of the 
numbers on the slot machine was higher than the target number by one point and the sum of 
the two numbers was greater than the target by 2 or 3. For similarity with the near-miss 
condition, on half of the trials one of the columns on the slot machine stopped in between two 
numbers. 
At the end of each trial, the sum of the two numbers was displayed on the screen (see 
figure 1). In addition, the screen turned green if they won and red if they lost. Participants 
were then presented with a screen asking them to report whether they had won. They clicked 
‘Y’ for yes and ‘N’ for no and they received one point each time that they clicked ‘Y’, 
regardless of whether they actually won on that trial. 
The study was carried out in small groups and participants were told it involved a 
multi-player game. They were competing against a fictitious player B and the one who 
accumulated the most points in the slot machine game would win a prize of 15 minutes of 
participation credit. To encourage participants to tell the truth, they were also told that the 
game included a third player, C, who could win a prize by judging whether the other players 
were truthful about their reported wins. They were told that to help participant C, they should 
tell the truth because previous studies show that this is what they are likely to assume. The 
full instructions are presented in supplementary materials. To enhance belief in the two 
fictitious players, participants had a chance to send a short message to them before the game 
began. In return they also received two messages. The message from participant B read: 
‘Good luck, but I will try to win this’, and the message from participant C read: ‘Please let 
me win, be truthful’. The game commenced after the two messages were displayed.  
 
 




Overall, 19 participants (31.1%), were truthful on all trials, and only 8 (13.1%) lied on 
all trials in which they would have gained from lying. The remaining 34 participants (55.7%) 
lied on some trials but not others. Most importantly, as predicted, participants lied 
significantly more in the near-miss condition (M = 3.21, SD = 3.10) than in the loss condition 
(M = 2.77, SD = 2.83), t(60) = -2.395, p = .020, d=.31. The result is consistent with our 
earlier findings which show that counterfactual availability increases the accessibility of lies 
and in addition shows that individuals will use these lies when given the opportunity.  
 
 
6. General Discussion 
The current paper is the first to directly investigate the influence of counterfactual 
thinking on deceptive communication. Study 1 showed that individuals with an inclination 
and ability to think counterfactually are more likely to generate lies. Our results also showed 
that when counterfactual alternatives are highly available, people are more likely to generate 
lies (Study 2), to judge that others will lie (Study 3) and to lie to others (Study 4). Overall, the 
findings from all of the four studies support the positive link between counterfactual thinking 
and deception and demonstrate that merely imagining an alternative scenario is sufficient to 
encourage deception.  
Counterfactual thoughts represent an account of what might have been and therefore 
provide a salient alternative which could be used to generate a lie. But, in our studies 
participants didn’t solely use the content of their counterfactual thoughts in generating 
deceptive responses; therefore the effect of counterfactual thoughts on deceptive 
communication may be in part through a content-neutral pathway (Epstude & Roese, 2008). 
Content neutral effects emerge when counterfactual thoughts ignite attentional and cognitive 
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processes that further influence behaviour independent of the specific information and 
meaning contained in the original thought. One possibility is that thinking about how a 
specific event could have been different increases the general availability of alternatives to 
past events which in turn aids the generation of lies. This is congruent with research which 
suggests that imagined events enable people to behave as though these were real, even when 
participants know they were not (Shidlovski, Schul & Mayo, 2014).  A potential explanation 
for this is that lying about imagined events, which are already active in working memory, is 
cognitively less demanding and thus easier. As noted earlier, working memory is one of the 
executive functions used in counterfactual thinking and deception (Walsh et al, 2016; 
Gombos, 2006).  
Another executive function which may contribute to the association between 
deception and counterfactuals is cognitive flexibility, namely the ability to switch between 
multiple representations.  This ability is necessary for counterfactual thought (Guajardo, 
McNally & Wright, 2016), and it might also help participants to report an experience in 
different ways, a skill crucial for effective lying (Leins, Fisher & Vrij, 2012). 
Creativity has been associated with deception (Gino and Ariely, 2012; but see Niepel, 
Mustafic, Greiff & Roberts, 2015) and certain types of counterfactual thoughts (Markman, 
Lindberg, Kray & Galinsky, 2007) and therefore could provide another possible explanation 
for why individuals who tend to think counterfactually also tend to lie. However, many 
counterfactual thoughts and lies are not creative (e.g., those that remove an event from a 
scenario; Gaut, 2003), and therefore this is unlikely to be the full explanation for the results.   
Beyond the cognitive links, counterfactual thinking may help to justify deception 
because events that could have been true may seem more plausible. For example, Shalvi et al. 
(2011) found that lies about the outcome of a die roll tended to be regarded as less unethical 
when the lie matched an alternative observed roll. Lies that only differ a little from the truth, 
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also feel more honest and are judged as more justifiable by others (Lelieveld, Shalvi, & 
Crone, 2016). Similarly, Schweitzer and Hsee (2002) found that car sellers were more likely 
to give an exaggerated estimate of the unknown mileage of a car when the estimate fell 
within a range of possible values. Therefore those who think that things happened nearly as 
they desired might lie about it more because they believe this is admissible to themselves as 
well as others.  
An additional motivational mechanism to be considered is affect. Counterfactual 
thoughts are known to elicit a wider range of affective reactions, such as guilt and shame 
(Neidenthal, Tangney & Gavansky, 1994). Although evidence about affect and subsequent 
deception is mixed, some studies also suggest that increased post-transgressional guilt can 
lead to an increase in subsequent deception (DePalma, Madey &  Bornschein, 1995). Thus, it 
could be that counterfactually derived affect also plays a role in the relationship between 
counterfactuals and deception. All of the hypotheses highlighted above should be investigated 
in the future.  
Independent of the mechanisms that characterise this relationship, our results have 
implications for the fields of both counterfactual thinking and deception. Firstly, they provide 
insight into the possible functions of counterfactual thinking. Its primary function is thought 
to be in helping people to learn from past mistakes and develop intentions for the future 
(Epstude & Roese, 2008). However, people often generate counterfactuals focussing on 
uncontrollable events which cannot be used to improve on the past (Ferrante, Girotto, Straga 
& Walsh, 2013) suggesting that counterfactual thinking may also serve other functions. Our 
findings suggest that one of those functions is to enable people to deceive. Given that lying 
can constitute an important phenomenon in interpersonal relationships, with some regarding 
it as a ‘social lubricant’ (Vrij, 2007), our results highlight the importance of counterfactual 
thinking for social functioning. The idea is consistent with findings that reasoning serves the 
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social function to persuade others (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). Secondly, these findings also 
contribute to the field of deception by helping to identify the processes that underlie it 
(Gamer & Ambach, 2014). Our current findings suggest that counterfactual thinking is one of 
those mechanisms. Our study also contributes to the emerging discussion regarding the role 
of individual differences in lying behaviour. Understanding the elements that characterise a 
frequent liar is of great relevance to the field of human communication. Currently, most 
theories of deception specify the role of basic cognitive processes such inhibitory control, 
working memory and response monitoring (e.g. Walczyck, Roper, Seeman and Humphrey, 
2003; Vendemia, Schillaci, Buzan, Green, & Meek, 2009) however studies such as the 
current one emphasise that in order to develop deception theories we need to also model the 
interplay between such general mechanisms and individual characteristics.  
In conclusion, we provide the first direct link between people’s tendency to think 
about alternatives to the past and lying. As a result we have new insight into how individual 
differences in the tendency to generate counterfactuals may influence people’s behaviour. 
Furthermore this research also identifies an additional cognitive process involved in 
deception. Overall, we have provided an initial step towards understanding the link between 
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1. Adele and Rachel are taking part in an experiment. They are given a die and told that if 
they roll a six three times they will win ten pounds. The experimenter cannot see the actual 
die rolls. Adele rolls two sixes, Rachel rolls one six.  
Counterfactual:  Who spends more time thinking about how things could have been different? 
Deception: Who is more likely to lie to the experimenter about the number of sixes they 
threw? 
 
2. Alison and Sarah’s parents ask them to be home in time for an important delivery after 
work. On her way, Alison stops off for a coffee for half an hour, something she usually does 
on her way home. Sarah also stops off for a coffee for half an hour on her way home although 
this is something she normally never does. Both of them arrive home just before the delivery 
was due only to discover that it arrived 5 minutes early and they missed it.  
Counterfactual:  Who spends more time thinking about how things could have been different? 
Deception: Who is more likely to lie to their parents about stopping on the way home? 
 
3. Jenny and Jacqui want to impress their friends by winning a game. In order to win the 
game they need to achieve a total score of 20 points. Jenny loses the game by 1 point. Jacqui 
loses the game by 10 points. Jenny and Jacqui’s friends don’t know what the score actually 
was.  
Counterfactual:  Who spends more time thinking about how things could have been different? 
Deception: Who is more likely to lie to their friends about winning the game? 
 
4. The day before their friend’s birthday Jack and Ed remember that they forgot to send them 
a birthday card. The last official collection of the post for the day is at 5pm. Both run to the 
post office but they get there late at 5:15. Jack finds out that the mail had been collected in 
time 15 min earlier. Ed finds out that the post was collected late, just one minute before they 
arrived. 
Counterfactual:  Who spends more time thinking about how things could have been different? 
Deception: Who is more likely to lie to their friend about posting the letter on time? 
 
5. John crashes his dad's car while driving on his usual way home. Bob crashes his dad's car 
whilst trying a new way home. 
Counterfactual:  Who spends more time thinking about how things could have been different? 
Deception: Who is more likely to lie to their dad about crashing the car? 




6. Steve and Aaron are asked by a friend to safeguard a valuable object for them. On his way 
home Steve gets off the bus at his usual bus stop but once the bus is gone realises that he 
forgot the object on the bus. On his way home Aaron gets off at a different stop from the one 
he usually gets off at and once the bus is gone realises that he forgot the valuable object on 
the bus. 
 
Counterfactual:  Who spends more time thinking about how things could have been different? 



















Please read carefully, you may earn an extra ½ point depending on the decisions you and the 
other participants make! 
During this study you will play a game with two others in this room. You will never know 
who the others are, and they will never know who you are. If you win the extra ½ will be 
added to your account after the end of the study. 
Due to the seat you have chosen, you will be person A. At the beginning of the game you will 
randomly be matched with two other people called person B and person C. The aim of the 
game is for you to gain more points than person B. Only ONE of you will get to win the extra 
½ point. The winner will be the person who wins the most points. Points are earned in the 
following way: 
In each of the 24 rounds you will be given a number. In order to gain a point, you need to 
spin a slot machine and get the two numbers on the machine to add up to the target number. 
For example, if you are assigned a 2, you need to spin either a 0 and a 2 OR a 1 and a 1. If the 
numbers that you spin don’t add up to the target number, you get no points. Also, if the slot 
machine stops in between numbers, the smaller number of the two will count. In each round, 
the computer will display the sum of the numbers you scored, and colours will indicate 
whether the round was lost or won, red for a loss, green for a win. 
At the end of each round, you will be asked to report whether you won or lost the round. 
CRUCIALLY, clicking ‘Y’ (for yes), will ALWAYS gain you a point (even if the two 
numbers do not add up to the target number). However, by clicking ‘Y’ when the numbers do 
not add up to the target number you will be negatively impacting person C. 
This is because person C will get to win ½ point only if they correctly identify the 
truthfulness of your messages. If you report a win and this is false, and person C chooses to 
class it as truthful, they lose a point. From our previous studies we know that the only sure 
way to help person C win is to be truthful, this is because in most cases person C will most 
likely start with the assumption that the other players will tell the truth. However, this could 
affect your own win. 
In summary, you have to compete against player B, and win more points in order to win the 
extra participation point, however you can also help or hinder participant C’s chances of 
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